Assessing Financial Vulnerability in Partial Dollarized Economies

Juan F. Castro

Eduardo Morón

Diego Winkelried
Assessing Financial Vulnerability in Partial Dollarized Economies*

By Juan F. Castro, Eduardo Morón** and Diego Winkelried

Noviembre 2004

Abstract

The reduction of macroeconomic vulnerability in emerging markets is at the core of the research agenda. Liability dollarization plays a vital role and its implications have been addressed in the literature via a “financial accelerator” mechanism. If we assess vulnerability in terms of the evolution of investment, we claim that, in absence of an asset price channel, departures from a pure float will mitigate vulnerability and improve welfare. Conversely, with an active asset price channel a tighter exchange rate policy will have marginal effects on welfare and vulnerability when compared to that associated to a reduction in liability dollarization.

Key words: Liability dollarization, financial vulnerability, fear of floating, monetary policy.

E-mail de los autores: castro_jf@up.edu.pe, emoron@up.edu.pe, dwinkelried@berp.gob.pe

* We wish to acknowledge very useful feedback from Roberto Duncan, Vicente Tuesta, Marco Vega, and participants at different seminars at the Central Bank of Peru, Central Bank of Uruguay, Superintendency of Banks at Peru, LACEA 2004, and the 2004 Latin American Econometric Society meetings. As usual the errors are ours.

** Corresponding author
1. Motivation

The reduction of macroeconomic vulnerability in emerging markets is now at the core of the research agenda. In this context, liability dollarization appears to play a vital role in the understanding of vulnerability and its implications have been addressed in the literature via the inclusion of a “financial accelerator” mechanism. In particular, its formalization is based on Bernanke’s et al. (1999) optimal contract, which predicts a negative relation between an external finance premium and firms’ net worth.

The financial accelerator operates through basically two channels. The first, emphasized in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler et al. (2001), implies fluctuations on asset prices that, in turn, affect the realized return on capital, net worth and investment decisions. The second channel is privileged in Céspedes et al. (2000a and 2000b) and depends on unanticipated movements in firms’ debt burden that directly affect their net worth. Not surprisingly, liability dollarization plays an important role in the activation of this second channel since the unexpected component of a real depreciation can greatly magnify the debt burden of firms indebted in dollars.

Based on this, Céspedes et al. (2000a y 2000b) propose a first approximation to a definition of vulnerability. Particularly, an economy is classified as vulnerable if real exchange rate depreciations lead to increases in the risk premium faced by firms. This result is neatly summarized in a dynamic equation for risk premium and, crucially, depends on firms’ leverage. Their framework, however, assumes complete depreciation of capital and thus, lacks the abovementioned asset price channel. Gertler et al. (2001) recognize this issue and

\footnote{1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).}
present some simulations using dollar denominated debt and an active asset price mechanism. They conclude that under full liability dollarization, an increase on the foreign interest rate leads to a fall in investment twice as large as under peso denominated debt. Interestingly, under both frameworks, a flexible exchange rate is preferred. In Céspedes et al. (2000a) the impact of a depreciation on net exports more than compensates the effect on real indebtedness. In Gertler et al. (2001), on the other hand, a fixed regime turns to be more damaging because of the effects of the domestic interest rate on the value of capital, which are magnified due to the asset price channel.

Despite these significant contributions to the understanding of the consequences of liability dollarization for investment and output fluctuations, some important extensions are in order. First, if we want to address the implications of the degree of dollarization, we need a general equilibrium model that admits firms’ debt to be denominated in both local and foreign currency (the two models just described assume full liability dollarization). Second, central bank’s response to exchange rate innovations (given a degree of dollarization) must also be assessed in a more continuous manner in order to allow for intermediate exchange rate regimes (since “fear of floating” seems a widespread characteristic of emerging economies). Given this mapping of policy options regarding the exchange rate and different degrees of liability dollarization, vulnerability and welfare can both be assessed considering the two channels through which the “financial accelerator” operates.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general equilibrium model with an extended financial accelerator mechanism that allows for debt to be denominated in two different currencies. Section 3 summarizes the results of a series of simulations for different
degrees of dollarization, exchange rate regimes, and weights given to the asset price channel. Finally, section 4 concludes and suggests some avenues for further research.

2. **An extended financial accelerator framework**

In this section we develop a general equilibrium model for policy and welfare analysis under partial liability dollarization. With the exception of the financial block of the model, the setup though simpler is very close to that of Gertler *et al.* (2001). After allowing for interior solutions regarding liability dollarization, this framework would permit us to assess the role of the asset price channel and the degree of central bank’s concern on exchange rate fluctuations. This multidimensional analysis is required if we are to understand vulnerability from a general equilibrium perspective and its policy implications with those that stem from a welfare point of view.

2.1 **The model**

The model refers to a small open economy which has six representative agents: (i) a household that demands consumption goods, offers labor and saves in pesos and dollars; (ii) a firm that demands capital and labor to produce the final domestic good and exports. This agent faces the agency problem that leads to a financial accelerator; (iii) a capital producer who sells capital to the firm; (iv) a retailer that buys the firm’s production and introduces price rigidities in the domestic good market; (v) a Central Bank that sets the domestic interest rate in response to the developments of the economy; and (vi) the rest of the world that shocks the economy through changes in the exports demand and the international interest rate.
2.1.1 The household

The household owns the profit-generating firm and each period receives the monetary profits $\Pi_t$ for retailing the domestic good. It also earns a nominal wage $W_t$ in exchange of labor. At time $t$, the household chooses the consumption $C_t$ and labor supply $L_t$ paths that maximize its discounted stream of utility. Additionally, it can save or borrow in assets denominated in two different currencies: pesos $B_t$, acquired in the domestic market and in dollars $B_t^*$, obtained in the international market.

**Consumption and saving**

The household intertemporal problem is:

$$
\max E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} U(C_s, L_s) \\
\text{st} \quad U(C_t, L_t) = \frac{C_t^{\gamma} - L_t^{1+\xi}}{1-\gamma} \\
\quad P_tC_t = W_tL_t + \Pi_t - B_{t+1} + (1+i_{t-1})B_t - S_tB_t^* + S_t(1+i_{t-1}^*)B_t^*
$$

where $\beta$ is the discount factor, $i_t$ and $i_t^*$ are the domestic and international nominal interest rates, respectively and $S_t$ is the nominal exchange rate. Since $P_t$ denotes the CPI index, the budget constraint is expressed in nominal terms. The utility function parameters are such that $\gamma \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\xi > 0$.

The FOCs of the above problem lead us to a familiar Euler equation for consumption:

$$
C_t^{\gamma} = \beta E_t \{ C_{t+1}^{\gamma} R_t \}
$$

(1)

where, provided that $\pi_t$ is the CPI inflation, the gross real interest rate is defined by the Fisher equation:
\[ R_t = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + E_t \{ \pi_{t+1} \}} \]  

(2)

On the other hand, the labor supply choice is determined according to:

\[ L^C_t \gamma_t = \frac{W_t}{P_t} \]  

(3)

Finally, the Euler equations for saving in both currencies imply:

\[ E_t \left\{ (1 + i_t) - (1 + i_t^*) \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right\} = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad E_t \left\{ \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right\} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + i_t^*} \]  

(4)

which is nothing but the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition.

**Consumer prices**

Domestic and imported goods compose aggregate consumption. The Law of One Price holds for the imported good and since the foreign price is normalized to one, the price of the imported good is equal to the exchange rate. On the other hand, the price of the domestic good is \( P^h_t \) and is set by the retailer (see below).

The following CES index defines household’s preferences over the consumption of the domestic good \( C_t^h \) and the imported good \( C_t^m \),

\[ C_t = \left[ \gamma^0 (C_t^h)^{\theta-1} + (1 - \gamma)^0 (C_t^m)^{\theta-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} \]

where \( \theta > 1 \) is the degree of substitutability between the two goods and \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) is usually interpreted as the degree of openness of the economy.
The corresponding consumer price index is given by

\[
P_t = \left[ \gamma(P_t^h)^{1-\theta} + (1 - \gamma)(S_t)^{1-\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}
\]  

(6)

For simplicity, we assume that the investment good is the same used for consumption. Moreover, we impose that the aggregation of domestic and imported investment is the same as that of consumption, thus

\[I_t = \left[ \gamma(I_t^h)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} + (1 - \gamma)(I_t^m)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}
\]

and the CPI (6) is the price of investment as well. The corresponding demands are:

\[I_t^h = \gamma\left(\frac{P_t^h}{P_t}\right)^{-\theta} I_t^h \quad \text{and} \quad I_t^m = (1 - \gamma)\left(\frac{S_t}{P_t}\right)^{-\theta} I_t^m
\]

(7)

2.1.2 Production, financing and retailing

Wholesale production and capital accumulation

An entrepreneur produces the domestic good and exports in a competitive market. It demands labor from households and buys capital from the capital producer to create output \(Y_t\) according to the production function

\[Y_t = (K_t)^{\alpha}(L_t)^{1-\alpha}
\]

(8)
If $P_i^{W}$ denotes the wholesale price index, then labor demand is determined by the cost-minimizing FOC:

\[
(1-\alpha) \frac{Y_t}{L_t} = \frac{W_t}{P_i^{W}} \tag{9}
\]

On the other hand, capital stock evolves in accordance with the accumulation rule:

\[
K_{t+1} = (1-\delta)K_t + \Phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) K_t, \tag{10}
\]

where $\delta$ is the depreciation rate and the concave function $\Phi(.)$ captures adjustment costs of aggregate investment $I_t$.

**Capital Production**

Given (10), the capital producer supplies the quantity of investment good implied in the Q-investment condition:

\[
E_t \left\{ Q_{t+1} \Phi' \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{K_{t+1}} \right) - 1 \right\} = 0, \tag{11}
\]

where $Q_t$ is the real market value of capital.

**The financial accelerator**

In period $t$, the firm’s gross project output equals the sum of real output revenues and the real market value of the capital stock, net of depreciation,

\[
Y_t^{W} = \frac{P_i^{W}}{P_i} Y_t + Q_t (1-\delta)K_t \tag{12}
\]

Equations (9) and (12) allow us to define the marginal gross return to capital (in pesos) as
\[
E_t \{ R^k_{t+1} \} = E_t \left\{ Y^w_{t+1} \frac{W_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} L_{t+1} \right\} = E_t \left\{ \alpha \frac{P^w_{t+1} Y^w_{t+1}}{P_{t+1} K_{t+1}} + Q_{t+1} (1 - \delta) \right\} 
\]

which is simply the ratio of next period’s ex-post gross output minus labor costs to period \( t \) market value of capital.

The capital producer will sell to the firm the amount of capital that equalizes (13) to her marginal financing costs. To derive such condition, the balance sheet identity of the entrepreneur is given by:

\[
Q_t K_{t+1} = N_t + \frac{D^*_{t+1}}{P_t} + S_t \frac{D^*_{t+1}}{P_t} 
\]

(14)

Capital acquisitions are financed either with the entrepreneur net worth or by contracting debt. The debt could be denominated in pesos (bonds sold to households) or in dollars (acquired in the international market).

For a given dollar debt ratio \( \lambda_t \), pesos and dollar debts obey to:

\[
S_t D^*_t = \lambda_t P_t (Q_t K_{t+1} - N_t) \\
D^*_{t+1} = (1 - \lambda_t) P_t (Q_t K_{t+1} - N_t) 
\]

(15)

Marginal costs equal the debt cost plus a risk premium. Thus, in equilibrium:

\[
E_t \{ R^k_{t+1} \} = (1 + \eta_{t+1}) \left[ \lambda_t (1 + i^*) + (1 - \lambda_t)(1 + i_t) \right] \left[ E_t \left\{ \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right\} \right] E_t \left\{ \frac{S_{t+1} P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right\} 
\]

which, using (2) and (4), is simply reduced to

\[
E_t \{ R^k_{t+1} \} = (1 + \eta_{t+1}) R_t 
\]

(16)
In (16) $\eta_t$ is the risk premium that arises because of the existence of agency costs. The optimal contract implies (according to Bernanke et al. (1999)) a positive relationship between the risk premium and the capital to net worth (leverage) ratio,

$$(1 + \eta_{t+1}) = F \left( \frac{Q_t K_{t+1}}{N_t} \right), \quad F' > 0$$

(17)

As in all previous general equilibrium settings that include a financial accelerator mechanism, this risk premium plays a central role. In particular, a fall in net worth due to either an increase in the realized debt burden or a fall in the realized return on capital will imply an increase in financing costs and a fall in next period’s investment following the Euler equation (16). It is important to notice that a negative shock on the realized return on capital is enough to trigger the financial accelerator mechanism since a fall in investment has also a negative effect on the market value of capital and, hence, on next period’s realized return (see equation (13)). Thus, the initial shock not only transpires within a period but is also magnified dynamically due to the forward-looking nature of both investment decisions and the market value of capital setting.\(^2\)

As already mentioned, Gertler et al. (2001) recognize the importance of the asset price channel and conduct some experiments under full liability dollarization, allowing for the market value of capital to affect investment returns. The extension we propose here is summarized in equation (15). In particular, we introduce a framework that allows different degrees of liability dollarization, as revealed by the presence of the term $\lambda_t$.

---

\(^2\) See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This “asset price channel” reveals that a financial accelerator is not only a feature of dollarized or partially dollarized economies. In fact, an increase in the firms’ debt burden (due to a real depreciation in the presence of liability dollarization) is just another channel by which the financial accelerator can be triggered.
Because of the UIP condition it might seem that, ex ante, the firm is indifferent between any combinations of peso or dollar debt. In fact, the term $\lambda_t$ is no longer present in equation (16). However, and despite the fact that we can express the Euler condition for investment decisions in terms of the domestic real interest rate even under full dollarization ($\lambda_t = 1$), we claim that the degree of liability dollarization has already been determined and is implicit because of the presence of a unique risk premium. This result stems from Castro and Morón (2003a) and is described in Appendix A.

Although the degree of liability dollarization is not present in the Euler equation governing investment decisions, its role becomes evident if we explore the evolution of net worth. For notational convenience we define the real foreign interest rate expressed in pesos as:

$$R_t^* = \frac{1 + i_t^*}{1 + E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\}} E_t \left( \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right).$$

(18)

In each period, the value of the entrepreneur depends on the ex-post (once all shocks have occurred) return to capital and the ex-post cost of borrowing:

$$V_t^* = R_t^* Q_{t-1} K_t - (1 + \eta_t) \left[ (1 + i_t^*) \frac{S_t^D_t}{P_t} + (1 + i_t^*) \frac{D_t^v}{P_t} \right].$$

Using (15), (2) and (18) the last expression simplifies to:

$$V_t^* = R_t^* Q_{t-1} K_t - (1 + \eta_t) \left[ \lambda_{t-1} R_{t-1}^* + (1 - \lambda_{t-1}) R_t \right] [Q_{t-1} K_t - N_{t-1}]$$

(19)

---

3 In fact, full liability dollarization does not render monetary policy as ineffective under any framework that includes a UIP condition and models investment as an ex-ante decision. Thus, financial dollarization should be regarded as a phenomenon that “complicates” rather than turns monetary policy ineffective.
It is clear from (19) that the higher the value of $\lambda_{t-1}$ (the degree of liability dollarization), the more negative the impact of a real depreciation on the evolution of the value of the entrepreneur.

Now consider that the entrepreneur consumes a (exogenous) proportion $(1 - \phi)$ of her value and, consequently, the remaining proportion $\phi$ is devoted to her net worth,

$$N_t = \phi V^e_t \quad \text{and} \quad C^e_t = (1 - \phi)V^e_t$$

In (20), $C^e_t$ is the entrepreneur’s consumption.

**Retailing and the domestic Phillips curve**

The retailer buys the firm’s production at the wholesale price $P^W_t$, “brands it” and sells it to households for consumption and to the firm for investment. In setting the final good price, it affords menu costs. We use Rotemberg (1982) approach to model nominal rigidities. It consists, first, in finding desired prices, as being in a flexible price environment, and then introducing costs of adjustment to move observed prices toward the optimal ones.

It is well known that the optimal flexible price decision reduces to a standard markup pricing over marginal costs. Therefore, the optimal price is $P^{opt}_t = \mu P^W_t$, where $\mu > 1$ is the markup. Letting the lower cases being the logs of the upper cases variables, the retailer problem is then:

$$\min_{\{p_t^h\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left[ \left( p^h_s - p^{opt}_s \right)^2 + \frac{1}{c} \left( p^h_s - p^h_{s-1} \right)^2 \right] \right\}$$

This problem is neatly solved in Vega and Winkelried (2004) and implies the equation

$$(1 + \beta \rho^2)\pi^h_t = \beta \rho E_t \{ \pi^h_{t+1} \} + \rho \pi^h_{t-1} + c \rho \Delta p^{opt}_t + iid$$
where 0 < \rho < 1 is a stable root of the price path such that \( \beta \rho^2 + 1 - \rho = (1 + \beta) \rho \).

Let \( \sigma_i = p_i^w - p_i \) denote the real (log) marginal cost. Then, for a constant markup
\[ \Delta p_i^{opt} = \Delta p_i^w = \Delta \sigma_i + \pi_i = \Delta \sigma_i + \gamma \pi_i^h + (1 - \gamma) \Delta s_i. \]
Upon replacing, we obtain the domestic inflation equation:
\[ \pi_i^h = \beta \kappa E_t [\pi_{i+1}^h] + \kappa \pi_{i-1}^h + (1 - \kappa (1 - \gamma) \Delta s_i + \kappa \kappa \Delta \sigma_i + \varepsilon_i^\pi \]
(21)
where \( \kappa = [1 + \beta + \gamma (1 - \gamma)]^{-1} \) and \( \varepsilon_i^\pi \) is an iid cost-push shock. Equation (21) is a linear-homogenous Phillips curve where inflation depends on real marginal costs. Nominal depreciation \( \Delta s_i \) appears in (21) due to the substitutability between the domestic and the imported good implied in (6).

### 2.1.3 Monetary Policy

The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate and is set by the central bank to adjust to deviations of forecasted CPI inflation, domestic output and, possibly, currency depreciation, from their respective target or desired levels. The log-linearized version of such a rule is given by
\[ i_t = f_x E_t [\pi_{i+1}^h] + f_y y_t + f_s \Delta s_t + \varepsilon_t^i \]
(22)
In the subsequent analysis, the parameter \( f_s \) will play an important role in controlling for the degree of central bank’s concern about exchange rate fluctuations.

### 2.1.4 Clearing conditions
To close the model we need four additional equations. First, the resource constraint:

\[ Y_i = C_i^h + C_i^e + I_i^h + X_i - (C_i^m + I_i^m) \]  

where \( X_i \) stands for exports of the home produced good. If \( Y_i^* \) denotes real foreign output, exports demand is given by the simple equation:

\[ X_i = \left( \frac{S_i}{P_i} \right)^{\theta^*} Y_i^* \]  

Two further equilibrium conditions are required. Given exports and imports in the model, the balance of domestic and external payments is

\[ C_i^m + I_i^m - X_i = S_i(D_i^* + B_i^*) - [(1 + \eta_i)D_{i-1}^* + B_{i-1}^*] R_{i-1}^* \]  

which simple states that the trade balance equals the capital account. Finally, equation (26) clears the domestic asset market.

\[ B_i - D_i = 0 \]

### 2.1.5 A Welfare index

For policy analysis, we use a utility-based welfare indicator\(^4\). As is discussed in Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003), a good candidate is the unconditional expectation of a second order approximation of the period utility function around its flexible-price steady state. The index is:

\[ Z = 1 - \text{var}(c_i) - \gamma \text{var}(l_i) \]  

\(^4\) The derivations and some discussion are presented in Appendix B.
where \( \text{var}(c_t) \) and \( \text{var}(l_t) \) are the asymptotic variances of the deviations of consumption and labor, respectively, from their steady state values. The constant \( \gamma > 0 \) depends on utility and production parameters and on the participation of consumption in the steady state overall expenditure. Clearly, this parameter establishes the relative importance for the variability of consumption to the variability of labor in welfare.

As evident from (27), welfare is negatively related to either variance and reaches its maximum when \( \text{var}(c_t) = \text{var}(l_t) = 0 \).

### 2.2 Steady state and calibration

We calibrate the model to replicate many short-run dynamic features of small open economies (the model period corresponds to a quarter). In this sense, the parameters governing preferences and technology are standard in the literature\(^5\).

It is important to note however that three parameters are allowed to vary in the simulations of the subsequent sections. The first one is the depreciation rate \( \delta \). When capital totally depreciates in a period (\( \delta = 1 \)) as in Céspedes \textit{et al.} (2000a and 2000b), the asset price channel plays no role. The alternative is to consider an active asset price channel, with an annual capital depreciation rate of 5 percent (\( \delta = 0.05/4 \)). As we may see, different values of \( \delta \) will lead to different values of some steady state ratios. In contrast, the other two varying parameters, the dollarization ratio \( \lambda \) and the response of the interest rate to nominal depreciation in the policy rule \( f_\delta \), do not alter the steady state values.

---

\(^5\) See, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Svensson (2000).
In the long-run, nominal variables grow at the inflation target, which is assumed to be an annual rate of 2 percent, and all real variables are driven by productivity shocks that grow at an exogenous rate. Since in our setting foreign inflation is zero, nominal depreciation must equal inflation in the long run to ensure a constant steady state real exchange rate.

We set the annual real interest rate to $r = 3$ percent, which implies a nominal rate of $i = 5$ percent and, using the Euler equation for consumption (1), a discount factor of $\beta = 0.99$. Following the UIP condition (4), we set the foreign interest rate steady state value to $i^* = 3$ percent annually.

Regarding the utility function, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\nu$ to 0.9, which implies an elasticity of consumption to the real interest rate equal to $-1.1$. Additionally, we fix $\xi$ so that the elasticity of labor demand to the real wage is 2.5. In the consumption and investment price aggregators (6) we calibrate an openness ratio of $1 - \gamma = 0.3$ and we set the elasticity of substitutability ($\theta$) to 11, to have a steady state markup of the retailer of $\mu = 10$ percent.

We consider a capital share of $\alpha = 0.35$ in (8), and an elasticity of the market value of capital to the investment to capital ratio of $\phi = -\left(\Phi'/\Phi\right)(I/K) = 0.250$ (equation (11)). On other side, given $\beta$ and $\gamma$, we fix the adjustment cost parameter of the retailer $c$ so the domestic Phillips curve (21) becomes

$$\pi_t^h = 0.46E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^h\} + 0.47\pi_{t-1}^h + 0.07\Delta s_t + 0.23\Delta \sigma_t + \varepsilon_t^s$$

which generates suitable dynamics of inflation.
In the financial block of the model, in a similar fashion than Céspedes, et al. (2000a) and Gertler, et al. (2001), we set a capital to net worth ratio \( \frac{QK}{N} \) to 3, which implies a leverage ratio of \( \zeta = 2 \). This choice affects some important steady state figures. First, the risk premium and the return of capital. Following (17), we set a value of the elasticity of the risk premium to leverage \( \delta = (F'/F)(QK/N) \) to obtain an equilibrium annual risk premium of 350 bps. With this, \( R^k - 1 = 6.5 \) percent. Second, it is easy to show that the contribution of the capitalist’s consumption to aggregate expenditure is

\[
\frac{C^c}{Y} = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \phi(1 - \delta)} \right) \alpha(1 - \phi) \left( \frac{QK}{N} \right)^{-1}
\]

which is a small number that varies between 0.2 and 5.7 percent according to the value of \( \delta \). The damping parameter \( \phi = 0.98 \) is set to satisfy the steady state version of the net worth evolution equation (19). All this calculations lead to a maximum debt to GDP ratio of about 12 percent and a maximum capital to gross output ratio

\[
\tau = \frac{PQ(1 - \delta)K}{\alpha P^wY + PQ(1 - \delta)K}
\]

of 0.96.

Regarding the resource constraint, we consider an aggregate consumption to GDP and aggregate investment to GDP ratios of 60 and 25 percent, respectively. Given the CPI aggregator, we set the exports to GDP ratio to ensure a long-run zero trade balance. This composition of expenditure is consistent with a value of \( \Upsilon = 0.95 \) in the welfare index (27) (see Appendix C).
Finally\(^6\), the calibrated policy rule is

\[
i_t = 1.50E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + 0.50y_t + f_s\Delta s_t + \varepsilon_t^i
\]

3. Financial vulnerability and welfare

As mentioned at the beginning of Section 2, our aim is not just to assess vulnerability as a function of the degree of financial dollarization, but to assess this phenomenon considering also the role of the asset price channel and central bank’s response to exchange rate movements. We believe this multidimensional analysis is required because, given a degree of liability dollarization and a shock that calls for a real depreciation, the effects of this shock on output and inflation will determine the central bank’s response depending on the specific weights given to the arguments in its reaction function. The resulting evolution of the domestic interest rate will, in turn, hit investment decisions in a way that may end up reinforcing or mitigating the negative effect of a higher debt burden. In this way, the resulting path of investment will be the result of this combination of forces that, in addition, may or may not be magnified depending on the importance given to the asset price channel.

3.1 The multiple dimensions of our analysis

Based on our model, we simulated the effects of a negative shock on export demand\(^7\) and computed impulse responses considering combinations of: (i) a pure \((f_s = 0)\) vs. a managed

---

\(^6\) The remaining parameters of the log-linearized version of the model displayed in Appendix B are: the exports price elasticity \((\theta^* = 1.5)\), the autoregressive coefficients of the exogenous forcing processes \((\rho_{x*} = \rho_{y*} = 0.5)\) and the variance of shocks \((0.01 \text{ for all shocks})\).

\(^7\) To solve the rational expectations equilibrium, we use the algorithm outlined in Klein (2000).
float \( (f_i = 1.25) \); and (ii) the asset price channel “switched” on \( (\delta = 0.05/4) \) and off \( (\delta = 1) \), for different degrees of liability dollarization. We also estimated level contours for both the response of investment and the welfare index under different degrees of liability dollarization \( (\lambda \in [0, 1]) \) and central bank’s concern with the exchange rate \( (f_s \in [0, 2]) \).

The analysis we propose will definitely drive us away from a neat analytical presentation as the one suggested in Céspedes et al. (2000a). However, an appealing feature of our model is that we are able to link vulnerability and the financial condition of firms without relying on changes in steady states values, but on the degree of liability dollarization.\(^8\)

Since the contributions of our model (and of any other which introduces a financial accelerator mechanism) are focused on capitalists’ decisions, the path of investment will be the source of novel results. Therefore, in all subsequent experiments we will assess vulnerability by measuring the response of investment. In particular, and in order to allow for the dynamic effects of our model to become evident (and avoid on-impact responses to dominate), investment contours were computed adding the quarterly response of investment for the first year. Since this evaluation may seem arbitrary, we complement this analysis with welfare assessments.

3.1.1 The asset price channel and the degree of liability dollarization

\(^8\) For example, the debt to GDP steady state ratio proves essential for Céspedes et al. (2000a) results regarding their flex-fix discussion. According to Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004), Céspedes et al. model requires a very high debt to GDP ratio steady state value (approximately 31%) to justify a peg. Under Elekdag and Tchakarov’s welfare metrics, however, this threshold falls to 16%. Beyond this discussion, and insulating from the risk of extreme parameterizations, our model can directly assess the role of dollarization for a given indebtedness level.
Given a degree of central bank’s concern with respect to the exchange rate, the asset price channel plays a crucial role in determining the effect of liability dollarization on the evolution of investment.

As revealed if we compare Figures 1 and 2, under a managed float the degree of liability dollarization will imply no significant difference in the evolution of investment if the asset price channel is not allowed to operate. Crucially, net worth depends on both the realized return to capital and realized debt burden and, as expected, return to capital falls on impact for any dollarization level (following the fall in output). However, net worth falls less in the non-dollarized economy because the debt burden does not increase with depreciation. Accordingly, the risk premium experiences a smaller increase in the non-dollarized economy. So, why is that investment behaves in the same manner for dollarized and non-dollarized economies when the asset price channel is switched off? Because the effect of a higher risk premium is not magnified via the asset price channel.

Both the market value of capital and investment decisions are forward-looking variables that respond to each other’s expected path. If we switch off the asset price channel, we mitigate the impact of the market value of capital on investment. Thus, and without the magnifying effect brought by this channel, the effect of a higher debt burden (because of a dollarized debt) is not strong enough to cause a significant deviation in the path of investment if we compare a dollarized with a non-dollarized economy.

This result highlights the importance of the asset price channel in understanding vulnerability. By looking only at the evolution of the risk premium, one could be tempted to classify a highly dollarized economy in Figure 2 as vulnerable. Nonetheless, and faced
with the evidence presented in Figure 1, no clear distinction can be made in terms of vulnerability without the asset price channel.

This result, however, heavily depends on the degree of Central Bank’s concern about exchange rate fluctuations. The balance sheet channel requires the magnifying effect of the asset price channel to render an economy as vulnerable when the Central Bank is mitigating the former. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of investment and several other variables under a pure float with no asset price channel. In this case, we can establish a clear distinction between a vulnerable and a robust economy solely as a function of the level of liability dollarization.

3.1.2 Central bank’s response to the exchange rate, investment and welfare

Since the degree of Central Bank’s concern about the exchange rate is a policy variable, we would like to stress its role in the determination of vulnerability and complement these results with a policy evaluation based on welfare considerations.

If we compare Figures 2 and 3 and focus our attention on a highly dollarized economy ($\lambda \rightarrow 1$), it seems that the central bank retains some ability to improve the performance of investment by increasing its degree of concern about the exchange rate, if the asset price channel is sufficiently weak. Evidence is less clear, however, if we allow the asset price channel to operate (compare Figures 1 and 4). In order to shed more light on this respect, Figures 5 and 6 present investment and welfare contours for different degrees of liability dollarization and central bank’s response to the exchange rate.
The evidence presented is suggestive in various aspects. First, and as already mentioned after comparing Figures 2 and 3, an increase in central bank’s concern with the exchange rate in an economy characterized by the absence of an asset price channel, can help improve investment performance after a negative shock on exports demand. In particular, and if we center our attention on Panel A of Figure 5, a fully dollarized economy can still exhibit a positive evolution in investment for a sufficiently large degree of central bank’s concern with the exchange rate. Moreover, and given the large positive slope that characterizes investment level contours when the asset price channel is switched off, the investment response can be rapidly increased as we move from a pure float to a tighter managed float. This result resembles Gertler, et al. (2001) argument regarding exchange rate policy in the absence of an asset price channel: “For countries with capital markets that are not sufficiently developed to incorporate market value-based accounting and collateral, it might be possible to make a case for fixed rates”.

Panel B in Figure 5 complements this evidence with a welfare evaluation. Interestingly, welfare level contours also exhibit a significantly large slope when the asset price channel is switched off. Thus, we can observe a rapid welfare improvement when moving away from a pure float. However, since we are concerned with second moments when talking about welfare, we can clearly identify a critical degree of central bank’s concern with the exchange rate after which any further tightening in exchange rate policy will imply a welfare loss.

It is worth noticing that there is a correspondence between investment and welfare level contours. If we focus our attention on a highly dollarized economy, improving investment performance (mitigating vulnerability) by means of a tighter exchange rate policy is also
welfare improving. However, the welfare assessment we propose complements this first result by imposing a limit to the degree of central bank’s concern with the exchange rate. Interestingly too, this “optimal degree of fear of floating” is not only a feature of highly dollarized economies. In fact, a non-dollarized economy can also benefit from a managed float in terms of welfare.

This result crucially depends on the absence of an asset price channel (see Figure 6) and can help refine Gertler et al. (2001) argument presented above. In particular, our analysis reveals that in those economies were market-based asset values do not play an important role in collateralizing lending, vulnerability can be mitigated and welfare improved by moving away from a pure float. However, welfare considerations suggest that this does not really imply a case for fixed rates nor is this a result valid only for highly dollarized economies. In fact, the crucial feature economies with different dollarization levels must share for the above to be true is the absence of an asset price channel for the financial accelerator. Under this scenario, a managed float would help stabilize output, consumption (and labor) without exacerbating investment⁹.

If we turn the asset price channel on (see Figure 6), one first obvious implication is that both investment performance and welfare deteriorates for a given degree of liability dollarization and central bank’s concern with the exchange rate. One less obvious result is the sharp decline in both investment and welfare contours’ slope. We can uncover two important implications from this result. First, the degree of liability dollarization does make a difference. In the same manner as the central bank of a highly dollarized economy remains unable to foster a positive response in investment through a tighter exchange rate

---

⁹ Note that weakening the asset price channel implies giving more weight to output, and less weight to the market value of capital, in the determination of investment return.
policy, it remains unable to prompt a significant welfare improvement by these means. In fact, vulnerability is mitigated and welfare is improved as we move away from a pure float, but only marginally.

The second implication comes directly from the one just mentioned. If we seek a significant reduction in vulnerability and welfare improvement, reducing the degree of liability dollarization seems to be the most adequate route, rather than tightening the exchange rate policy.

4. Concluding remarks and avenues for further research

After allowing for different degrees of liability dollarization in a general equilibrium framework that incorporates an asset price channel for the financial accelerator mechanism, our model has uncovered some important implications about the role of (i) liability dollarization; (ii) the asset price channel; and (iii) central bank’s commitment with the exchange rate.

In particular, the existence of an asset price channel proves important to understand the role of the degree of liability dollarization in explaining vulnerability. In fact, evidence suggests that in those economies characterized by a managed float and where market-based asset values do not play an important role in collateralizing lending (the asset price channel is sufficiently weak), a high degree of liability dollarization is not enough to explain significant departures in the evolution of investment when compared to non-dollarized economies.
More importantly in terms of monetary policy options, the asset price channel plays also a crucial role to understand the effects of different exchange rate regimes on investment performance and welfare. If we assess vulnerability in terms of the evolution of investment, we claim that, in absence of an asset price channel, departures from a pure float will not only help mitigate vulnerability but will also be welfare improving. This result, however, cannot be linked to the degree of liability dollarization. Evidence suggests that a managed float may be the optimal even for non-dollarized economies.

Given this result, can we make a case for “fear of floating” as a welfare improving and “vulnerability mitigating” policy option for highly dollarized economies that exhibit a strong asset price channel? Evidence reveals that under such scenario, a tighter exchange rate policy will only have a marginal effect on welfare and vulnerability when compared to that associated to a reduction in liability dollarization.

If policymakers take the degree of liability dollarization as exogenous, “fear of floating” may seem a natural feature of highly dollarized economies after invoking welfare and vulnerability considerations. The above result, however, suggests that this is a second best. Despite the fact we cannot characterize it a pure policy variable, dedollarization reveals to be much more effective in fostering welfare and mitigating vulnerability if we regard an economy as characterized by the presence of a strong asset price channel.

In the dedollarization debate, which our analysis reveals to be particularly important only under the presence of an asset price channel for the financial accelerator, one of the main issues that still awaits further research in a general equilibrium context is the connection between central bank actions and the degree of liability dollarization. Partial equilibrium models that stress portfolio considerations (see Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998) and Castro and
Morón (2003b)) point out the importance of reducing the relative variance of inflation to real depreciation\(^\text{10}\). They claim that an inflation targeting scheme should account for the numerator while less “fear of floating” should help increase the denominator, thus fostering financial dedollarization. However, policy recommendations derived from these models face the risk of triggering now (via a more volatile exchange rate) the balance sheet effects that the dedollarization effort seeks to avoid in the future.

When assessing this risk, two elements must be accounted for: (i) the effects that moving towards a pure float has on investment and welfare under a context of significant liability dollarization; (ii) central bank’s ability to reduce dollarization by means of a more volatile exchange rate. Regarding this, our analysis has uncovered some important results related to the first of the two elements just mentioned. Given the above evidence, we could claim that if moving towards a pure float effectively reduces dollarization, this should be the preferred policy option in those economies were, in Gertler et al. (2001) terms, capital markets that are sufficiently developed to incorporate market value-based accounting and collateral\(^\text{11}\).

Crucially, the “if” part in the preceding argument depends on the second element. Thus, further research should now be devoted to assess this “ability” in a general equilibrium context allowing for different degrees of liability dollarization, different degrees of concern of the central bank regarding the exchange rate, taking as given a financial accelerator with a balance sheet and an asset price channel.

\(^{10}\) Others, like Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003), stress the role of currency-blind regulations when explaining deposit dollarization.

\(^{11}\) If we rely on Broda and Levy Yeyati’s (2003) results, safety nets that discriminate between currencies could also be regarded as welfare improving in economies characterized by the existence of a strong asset price channel.
5. References


Appendix A: A unique risk premium under partial dollarization

A particular feature of this model (shared by others like Gertler et al. (2001) and Céspedes et al. (2000a and 2000b)) is that it relies on Bernanke et al. (1999) optimal contract to justify the presence of a negative relation between the share of the firm’s capital investment that is financed by its own net worth (N) and the external finance premium\(^\text{12}\).

Contract terms in Bernanke et al. (1999) stem from the solution to a costly state verification (CSV) problem where the lender has to incur in auditing costs in the event of a default. Default, in turn, is triggered by the existence of idiosyncratic shocks \((\omega \in [0, \infty); E(\omega) = 1)\) which affect the realized return to the investment project \((\omega R^k)\). Given firm’s decision regarding capital investment \((QK)\) and borrowing \((QK - N)\), and for a given ex-post aggregate return to capital \((R_k)\), the optimal contract is characterized by a threshold value for the idiosyncratic shock \((\bar{\omega})\) and a gross non-default rate which depends on this cutoff value \((\bar{\omega}R^k QK)\). When the realized shock is above (or equal) to this threshold, the entrepreneur pays the lender the non-default rate and retains the difference. For realizations below this threshold, on the other hand, the firm declares default, the lender pays the auditing cost and earns what is left.

With this partial equilibrium setting, the optimal contracting problem requires the entrepreneur to choose \(\bar{\omega}\) and the capital to net worth ratio \((k = QK / N)\) in order to maximize its expected share of the total return on capital, subject to the restriction that the lender’s expected return (net of auditing costs) equals its opportunity cost, given by the safe asset rate \((R)\). Bernanke et al. (1999) show that the first order conditions associated to this

\(^{12}\) The inverse of the ratio introduced in equation (17) in the main text.
problem imply a positive relation between \( \bar{\omega} \) and the external finance premium 
\[(1 + \eta) = R^k / R, \]
and between \( \bar{\omega} \) and the capital to net worth ratio \( k \). Thus, the premium on external funds can be expressed as an increasing function of this ratio (or as a decreasing function the share of the firm’s capital investment that is financed by its own net worth, as mentioned above).

Castro and Morón (2003a) propose an extension to this contract problem in order to account for the existence of debt denominated in two currencies. In particular, they argue that the relevant gross return per unit of capital can be expressed as \( \tau \omega R^k \) \((0 < \tau \leq 1)\) when there is a mismatch between the denomination of debt and firm’s revenues. Although this modification might seem similar to that proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) when considering the existence of aggregate risk, it should be noted that \( \tau \) does not represent an aggregate shock to the profit rate.

As recognized in Bernanke et al. (1999), with aggregate risk, \( \bar{\omega} \) will depend on the \textit{ex-post} realization of the return to capital. This implies the existence of a set of state contingent solutions to the maximization problem described above (depending on the realization of the aggregate shock). In particular, an aggregate shock that affects the return to capital negatively will imply a rise in \( \bar{\omega} \) and this, in turn, will mean that both the default probability and the non-default rate \((\bar{\omega} R^k Q K)\) increase: it will now be easier to observe realizations of \( \omega \) below \( \bar{\omega} \) and, accordingly, the non-default rate rises to compensate for the increased default probability. In order to motivate this kind of state contingent contract and to allow aggregate shocks to affect contract terms, the authors introduce debt with a shorter maturity than the project, so that debt is rolled over after the realization of the aggregate shock. Under this new scenario, the authors solve the maximization problem after
taking expectations over the distribution of the aggregate shock, and demonstrate that the
premium on external funds can still be expressed as an increasing function of k.

Castro and Morón’s setting is different in the sense that the existence of a mismatch is
known \textit{ex-ante} and it implies a larger variability in the realization of the aggregate return to
capital relative to the no-mismatch situation. So, instead of introducing the possibility of
debt being rolled over and different contract terms arising after the realization of the
aggregate shock, different contract terms are introduced, \textit{ex-ante}, relative to the no-
mismatch situation. Uncertainty regarding the evolution of the exchange rate implies the
existence of a different contract which calls, in equilibrium, for a larger value of \( \bar{\omega} \) and,
accordingly, for a larger non-default rate. This is what the term \( \tau \ (0 < \tau \leq 1) \) is meant to
capture. In particular, a smaller value for \( \tau \) will entail, in equilibrium, a larger value for \( \bar{\omega} \),
and this can be understood as capturing the existence of more uncertainty regarding the
evolution of the exchange rate which, in turn, implies more uncertainty regarding the
realization of the aggregate return to capital under a mismatch.

Under this setting, the authors show that \( \frac{\partial^2 (1+\eta)}{\partial k \partial \tau} < 0 \), meaning that any deviation of \( \tau \)
below unity will lead to a larger sensitivity of the risk premium with respect to the capital
to net worth ratio. When determining contract terms under a mismatch we can abstract from
the existence of a continuous support for \( \tau \), and just concentrate on the fact that the
mismatch will imply a deviation of \( \tau \) below unity (for any non-trivial uncertainty regarding
the evolution of the exchange rate).
If we rely on the functional form usually proposed for the relation between these two variables, the above result justifies the introduction of a larger risk premium if the denomination of debt implies a mismatch. Formally:

$$(1 + \eta)_{NM} = k^{\hat{\vartheta}}, \quad (1 + \eta)_M = k^{\hat{\vartheta}};$$

where $\hat{\vartheta}$ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the capital to net worth ratio. According to the above result, $\hat{\vartheta}_2 > \hat{\vartheta}_1$, which implies a larger risk premium under a mismatch ($(1 + \eta)_M$) relative to the no-mismatch situation ($(1 + \eta)_{NM}$).

Finally, the existence of a unique relevant risk premium for a given proportion of debt denominated in dollars, stems from Castro and Morón’s (2003a) partial equilibrium setting. They assume a continuum of firms which sell in the local market and seek financing. Information about the denomination of their revenues, however, is not publicly available. In particular, the denomination of firms’ revenues is not homogenously accessible across firms, so they differentiate by the cost that the financial intermediary has to incur in order to verify this information. Accordingly, firms are indexed by $\varphi_i \in [0,1]$, and this cost is an increasing function of the characteristic $\varphi_i$. Due to the existence of this cost, the intermediary will find it optimal to discriminate (and classify a firm as a “peso earner”) only up to a certain threshold ($\varphi^*_i$).

Results that stem from the above setting can be easily carried into our general equilibrium model. In fact, and for a given proportion of projects selling in the local market, we can assume they exhibit some underlying characteristic (from which we can abstract when solving the general equilibrium model) which implies that verifying the information regarding the denomination of their revenues is more costly than for others. Therefore, and
following Castro and Morón, all projects \( \varphi_i \in [0, \varphi_i^*] \) will be discriminated, adequately classified as “peso earners”, and charged with a higher risk premium \((1 + \eta)_M\) when asking for a credit denominated in dollars.

In their model, Castro and Morón assume that firms which are not discriminated \((\varphi_i \in ]\varphi_i^*, 1]\) are, by default, classified as “dollar earners” and, thus, charged with a higher risk premium \((1 + \eta)_M\) when asking for a credit denominated in pesos. Since our intention is to justify the existence of a given proportion of dollarized liabilities \((\lambda \in [0, 1])\), we really do not need to rely on this assumption. Instead, we can assume that, in general, there exists a non-trivial proportion of projects \((\lambda \leq 1 - \varphi_i^*)\) which are not discriminated and classified as “dollar earners”\(^{13}\).

Given the above, all projects classified as “peso earners” \((1 - \lambda \geq \varphi_i^*)\) will have the smallest risk premium \((1 + \eta)_NM\) attached to debt denominated in pesos. The contrary will happen for all projects classified as “dollar earners” \((\lambda)\). Thus, and since all firms will choose, \textit{ex-ante}, the debt denomination with the smallest cost, it is possible to justify the existence of debt denominated in both currencies and only one relevant risk premium \((1 + \eta)_NM = k^{\varphi_i} = k^0 = (1 + \eta)\).

\(^{13}\) Note that our intention is not to endogenize the proportion of dollarized liabilities but to work with any given proportion in the support \([0, 1]\). If we were to endogenize \(\lambda\), we could no longer abstract from the underlying characteristic that implies different discrimination costs when solving the general equilibrium model. As already mentioned, this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Appendix B: Derivation of the Welfare Index

Following Erceg, et al. (2000), the expectation of the quadratic term of the second order approximation of the period utility function is

\[ \Theta = U_{cc} C^2 \text{var}(c_t) + U_{cl} \text{cov}(c_t, l_t) + U_{ll} L^2 \text{var}(l_t) \]  

(B1)

where \( c_t \) and \( l_t \) are the deviations of consumption and labor, respectively, from its steady state values, \( C \) and \( L \), and \( \text{var} \) stands for the asymptotic variance operator. In (B1) we have suppressed any constant term.

Note that the simple utility function used in the text implies that \( U_{cl} = 0 \), \( U_{cc} < 0 \) and \( U_{ll} < 0 \). With this, expression (B1) is unambiguously negative and measures the welfare losses related to fluctuations in consumption and labor. In order to get an index decreasing in both asymptotic variances, we shall consider instead

\[ Z = 1 - \frac{\Theta}{U_{cc} C^2} \]  

(B2)

so the bigger \( Z \) is, the higher the welfare (the smaller the welfare losses).

We now move to express (B2) in terms of the model’s parameters and steady state values.

Note that

\[ Z = 1 - \text{var}(c_t) - \frac{U_{ll} L^2}{U_{cc} C^2} \text{var}(l_t) \]  

(B3)

It is useful to recall some of the properties of the utility function. In particular,
\[ U_C = C^{-v} \quad \text{and} \quad U_L = -L^\xi \]
\[ U_{CC} = -\frac{v}{C} U_C \quad \text{and} \quad U_{LL} = \frac{\xi}{L} U_L \]  \hspace{1cm} (B4)

On the other hand, the labor supply (3) and the firm’s labor demand (9) implies in steady state that

\[ -\frac{U_L}{U_C} = \frac{W}{P} \quad \text{and} \quad (1-\alpha) \frac{Y}{L} = \frac{W}{p^w} \]  \hspace{1cm} (B5)

Finally, the flexible-price pricing over marginal cost implies in equilibrium that

\[ \frac{p^h}{p^w} = \frac{P}{p^w} = \mu \]  \hspace{1cm} (B6)

Combining (B4), (B5) and (B6) is easy to verify that

\[ \frac{U_{LL} L^2}{U_{CC} C^2} = \frac{\xi (1-\alpha) Y}{\frac{v}{C}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (B7)

So that the welfare index becomes

\[ Z = 1 - \var(c_t) - \left( \frac{\xi (1-\alpha) Y}{\frac{v}{C}} \right) \var(l_t) = 1 - \var(c_t) - \frac{Y}{\mu} \var(l_t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (B8)

which is equation (27) in the main text.
Figure 1: Shock to exports, managed float, asset price channel on

Figure 2: Shock to exports, managed float, asset price channel off
Figure 3: Shock to exports, pure float, asset price channel off

Figure 4: Shock to exports, pure float, asset price channel on
Figure 5: Investment and welfare contours, asset price channel off
Panel A: Investment response, first four quarters, shock to exports

Panel B: Welfare index
Figure 6: Investment and welfare contours, asset price channel on
Panel A: Investment response, first four quarters, shock to exports

Panel B: Welfare index